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Health, wealth and where one lives are important, if not the three most important material 
living conditions. This paper investigates the joint evolution of these three conditions. The elderly 
reach their early post-retirement years in an initial status that is characterized by housing wealth, 
non-housing bequeathable wealth, annuity income, health status, and family connections. The 
broad goal of this paper is to describe the trajectories of health, wealth and living arrangements in 
older age that start from this initial state; to understand how the trajectories of health status, wealth 
position and living arrangements are interrelated with each other; and to be able to predict how 
health and living arrangements will evolve when economic and other conditions change. 
Projecting the trajectories of health, wealth and living arrangements into the future is not a 
trivial task. Simple cross-sectional statistics may lead one astray. For instance, we find in cross-
section data an increasing propensity for elderly individuals to live with others, especially their 
children (Börsch-Supan, 1988, 1990; Ellwood and Kane, 1990; Wolf, 1995).  But the living 
arrangements of the oldest may not be a good prediction of the living arrangement of those just 
entering their post-retirement years.  Because of differences in the economic resources of the 
cohorts the younger cohorts are likely to reach the oldest ages with more resources, and, assuming 
that living alone is a superior good, they will have a greater propensity to live alone (Börsch-
Supan, Kotlikoff and Morris, 1991; McGarry and Schoeni, 1998).  Furthermore, the observed age 
profiles of living arrangements are not followed by any person or couple:  because the poorest in a 
cohort die sooner than the better off, the average value of wealth, health or housing of a cohort will 
increase with age even in the absence of any systematic change at the individual or household 
level. 
Yet, understanding the age path and determinants of living arrangements is important both 
from a social point of view and from a scientific point of view.  For example, as shown in the   3
Table 1, living with other family members is a substantial economic resource that is frequently 
ignored in assessing the economic well-being of the oldest old (Cox and Raines, 1985; Kotlikoff 
and Morris, 1989; Sloan and Shayme, 1993; Grad, 1994).  This is evidenced, for example, by a 
much lower poverty rate of elderly widows living with other family members as compared to the 
poverty rate of widows in the general population:  
 
 
Table 1: Poverty and living arrangements 
 
Poverty rates (percent) 





Live with other 
family 
members 
Live with no 
family 
members 
65-74 6  12  24 
75-84 7  12  28 
85 or over  10  10  31 
   
Source:  Grad, 1994 
 
The frail elderly receive care when living with others, either with a spouse or with 
children, that can substitute for market-purchased care or for long-term care provided thought 
public programs such as Medicaid (Wolf, 1984, 1994; McGarry and Schoeni, 1998). There is even 
some suggestion that living arrangements affect the health of the elderly person: apparently being 
cared for in the home of a family member is better for health outcomes than institutionally 
provided long-term care (Moon, 1983; Horowitz, 1985; Stone et al. 1987). 
From a scientific point of view, the main model of consumption and saving by the elderly, 
the life-cycle model, is incomplete if it does not recognize the additional resources that may be 
transferred through joint living (Hurd, 1990).  For example, it is plausible that the magnitude of 
such transfers are greater than measured cash transfers to an independently living parent. There are 
many other examples of a close relationships among living arrangements, health and economic 
status. For instance, an unexpected decline in wealth may trigger a transition to joint living to 
conserve resources. A decline in health may cause a transition to joint living or into a nursing home 
for the provision of care. The probability of either transition would be modified by other important 
covariates. In the first case, health status could act through differences in life expectancy or need 
for care. In the second case, economic status would be important because of the possibility of   4
purchasing care in the market. In both cases the number and location of children would be 
important as well as their sex and economic status. For example a well-to-do son may prefer to 
transfer cash for the market purchase of services whereas a daughter may prefer to provide the 
services directly. 
These examples suggest that living arrangements and well-being derived from health and 
economic status are closely related and that their evolution over the life course should be studied 
jointly. This is the of this paper. We study the relationships among living arrangements, health and 
economic status using a microeconometric approach similar to what is known as “vector 
autoregressions” (VAR) in the macroeconomics literature. 
The economic determinants of living arrangements have had relatively little research 
attention compared with other aspects of the well-being of the oldest old.  For example, the early 
analyses of the Study of Asset and Health Dynamics of the Oldest Old (AHEAD) did not explicitly 
consider the choice of living arrangements (Henretta et al., 1997; Wolf et al., 1997), although the 
importance of family care for elderly parents was stressed in both articles.1  Because research on 
the economic determinants of living arrangements is not well developed, we are not adequately 
equipped to understand the decline in the propensity to co-reside with children that began in the 
late 1970s and early 1980s (Börsch-Supan, 1990; Ellwood and Kane, 1990; Kotlikoff and Morris, 
1990; Wolf, 1995; Costa, 1997). It is important to understand how this decrease came about and 
whether it is related to changes in the economic circumstances of the elderly.  Specifically, we 
would like to understand whether the decrease is related to a change in family linkages or to the 
increase in Social Security wealth and Medicare benefits, as suggested by Wolf (1995), Costa 
(1997) and McGarry and Schoeni (1998). This understanding would help to assess the likely 
impact of future changes in the generosity of Social Security and Medicare benefits, as well as the 
potential impact of changes in the extent of family links when the baby boom generation will need 
to support their elderly parents. 
We also lack reliable knowledge of some fundamental facts. For example, it is 
controversial whether the elderly downsize housing in old age and extract equity for non-housing 
consumption (Ai et al., 1990; Venti and Wise, 1990, 2001; Sheiner and Weil, 1992). We do not 
know the quantitative importance of the progression of care from living independently to co-
residing with children to living in a nursing home. We do not know whether co-residing with 
                                                 
1 Wolf (1994) provides an extensive survey of the literature.   5
children changes bequest behavior. The AHEAD data on which this paper is based are well-suited 
to start answering these questions. 
Because many fundamental facts are still unclear, our research will proceed in steps. In 
this paper, we will begin with establishing a reliable account of how living arrangements, health 
and economic status evolve as the elderly age and by linking these trajectories to observable 
covariates. In this sense, this paper is mainly descriptive, although it does use multidimensional 
regression methods. It extends the analysis by Hurd, McFadden and Merrill (1998) by a third 
dimension, namely living arrangements, and applies a richer methodology. Further research will 
take account of the considerable heterogeneity in our sample. Accounting for the heterogeneity in 
order to properly isolate the effects of economic and other covariates will require more advanced 
econometric methods (e.g., the MPMNP-model in Börsch-Supan, Hajivassiliou, Kotlikoff and 
Morris, 1992, and the MIMIC-model in Börsch-Supan, McFadden and Schnabel, 1996). Once we 
have precise estimates of the influence that these covariates exert on living arrangements, health 
and economic status, we can compare our estimated coefficients and predicted trajectories to those 
generated by leading behavioral models. This will be the subject of further research. 
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the AHEAD data and presents 
some central descriptive statistics. Section 3 develops our methodology to estimate transition 
probabilities based on relatively simple first-order Markov-processes. Section 4 describes our 
estimation results. Section 5 constructs and interprets predicted trajectories of health, wealth and 
living arrangements which start at age 70 and go through age 90. Section 6 focuses on a specific 
aspect of these trajectories, the reduction in homeownership.  Section 7 briefly concludes. 
 
2. Data 
Our work is based on the first four waves of the Study of Asset and Health Dynamics of 
the Oldest Old (AHEAD). AHEAD is particularly well suited for the purposes of this paper 
because one module was specifically designed to study living arrangements and intergenerational 
transfers both of money and time help, and how they relate to health and economic status. 
AHEAD is a biennial panel that is being collected by the Survey Research Center at the 
University of Michigan. It is now a part of the US Health and Retirement Survey (HRS). AHEAD 
is nationally representative of the cohorts born in 1923 or earlier with oversampling of blacks,   6
Hispanics and Floridians. We will focus on age-eligible individuals, i.e. those persons from the 
cohorts of 1923 or earlier who were approximately ages 70 or older at baseline in 1993. 
The AHEAD panel is the first data set that permits combining the study of asset 
decumulation and health with the study of living arrangements of the oldest old.  In fact, AHEAD 
was specifically designed to enable a comprehensive understanding of how health and wealth 
status affect the well-being of the elderly as they age (Soldo et al., 1997).For instance, the AHEAD 
survey has much more reliable measures of the wealth of the elderly than the data sets employed in 
previous analyses, more extensive health information, and the AHEAD data identifies in a better 
way family links, in particular the economic resources of the children who, at some point in the 
future, may co-reside with the elderly person. 
While the AHEAD data starts with a sample of the non-institutionalized, the panel tracks 
the elderly when they enter a nursing home or similar institutions.  We can observe asset changes 
at the time of this transition.  The AHEAD data supply information on changes in the economic 
status of children and parents, together with changes in health and changes in housing and living 
arrangements.  The AHEAD data contain a proxy interview after the death of the respondent such 
that the living arrangement at the time of death can be ascertained. 
AHEAD as well as the other cohorts in HRS have cores with questions in the following 
broad classes: Employment (current and former jobs); health measures including self-assessed 
health, performance measures, disease conditions, cognition, mood, and ADL and IADL 
limitations; income and assets; family structure and intergenerational transfers both of financial 
help and time help; housing; insurance; and pensions.   
In addition to the core content, the survey obtained a roster of the extended family 
including a number of characteristics of each child of the AHEAD respondent. Of importance for 
this paper, the characteristics include education, income, home ownership, marital status and 
parental status. Children from the family roster were linked during the computer-assisted interview 
to both financial help and time help given to the AHEAD respondent.  This linkage will permit 
analyses of motivations for transfers such as whether the less well-to-do child receives greater 
financial transfers from the AHEAD parent, and if, in turn, that child provides greater time help.  
Information about the beneficiaries of life insurance and of wills was obtained. Anticipated 
bequests were measured by questions about the subjective probability of giving a bequest and its 
magnitude.  Considerable information about housing was obtained at baseline including   7
adaptations of housing to disabilities.  This is important since such adaptations offer an alternative 
to moving when health deteriorates. 
The AHEAD survey contains a psychometric battery with questions asking for subjective 
beliefs such as: „Using any number from 0 to 100 where "0" means that you think there is 
absolutely no chance and "100" means that you think the event is absolutely sure to happen, what 
do you think are the chances that you will have to give major financial help to family members 
during the next 10 years? ...that you will receive major financial help from family members during 
the next 10 years? ...that you will move to a nursing home over the next five years?“  In a similar 
way subjects who were 70-74 at baseline were asked to give their subjective survival probability to 
age 85;  subjects who were 75-79 were asked their survival probability to age 90 and so forth.   
These subjective survival probabilities are highly predictive of mortality between waves 1 and 2 
(Hurd and McFadden, 1998). 
As in all household level data sets, the frequency of missing asset items is fairly large in 
AHEAD.  However, AHEAD (as well as HRS) made extensive use of bracketing techniques which 
converted nonresponses on asset amounts to intervals by a series of questions about the range of 
the asset amount (Smith, 1995).  Because the distribution of financial assets in particular is highly 
skewed, these techniques are very valuable in reducing imputation error. We have spent 
considerable effort developing and implementing methods to impute missing asset items based on 
the brackets (Hoynes, Hurd and Chand, 1997). The methods involve using bracket information and 
covariates in a way that conserves the multivariate distribution of assets and other characteristics. 
The construction of wealth quartiles in this paper rests on this method. 
In the first AHEAD wave in 1993, 8,222 interviews were obtained. We restrict our 
analysis to those individual who were born before 1924, ignoring 779 younger spouses. In either of 
the waves 2 (1995) through 4 (1999), no interview could be obtained for 865 of the remaining 
respondents, leaving 6,578 for our analysis. By wave 4, 2,508 (38%) of those respondents have 
died. In total, 21,296 interviews (on average 3.2 interviews per respondent) and 14,718 transitions 
(2.2 per respondent) are available for the analysis. 
Table 2 shows descriptive statistics of the most important variables for our study. The 
average age is 80 years and between two waves, on average 14.6 percent of the respondents die. 62 
percent of the respondents are female, reflecting the higher life expectancy. 46 percent of the 
respondents are married – 85 percent of the others are widowed, the others are either divorced or   8
never married. 72 percent of the interviewees own their home. 75 percent live on their own, 19 
percent co-reside with others – mostly with their children and/or grandchildren. Since in wave 1 
only non-institutionalized individuals were interviewed, only respondents who move to nursing 
homes after that are followed there. This results in only 4.3 percent of interviews in nursing homes. 
The average respondent has 2.8 children, 1.4 of whom are female. On average, 1.9 of these 
children are married and 2.3 
Table 2: Variables 





Health condition prevalence (heart, stroke, cancer)  0.506
Health condition incidence  0.177
Health status:  Excellent / very good  0.306
 Good  0.303
  Fair / Poor  0.391
Home ownership  0.721
Living arrangements:  Alone  0.765
 with  others  0.192
 nurs.home  0.043
Number of children:  Total  2.780
 Female  1.416
 Married  1.942
 With  children  2.345
Source: AHEAD, pooled waves 1-4. 
 
Figure 1 shows age-paths of the most important variables of our analysis. They represent 
simple averages of these variables for the respondents of the respective age in a pooled cross-
section of the AHEAD data, waves 1 through 4. Three effects drive the shape of these curves. The 
first is cohort differences.  The second effect is the evolution of the variables over the life course: 
Older respondents report a worse health status and face a larger threat of health condition incidents. 
The third effect is differential mortality. It affects the mean characteristics of the (surviving) 
respondents. This third effect seems to dominate the health measures for the very old: Health status 
and health condition prevalence are actually more favorable for the (very few) centenarians than 
for those aged around 90. The share of the respondents in the highest wealth quartiles gradually 
decreases in the age, whereas the rises of the share of the poorest quartile seems to be more 
pronounced for those aged 85 and above. This is the same age group for which the share of   9
respondents living alone decreases dramatically and both nursing homes and co-residence become 
important alternatives.  
 
Figure 1: Age patterns in the four pooled cross-sections 1993-1999 
 
Source: Pooled AHEAD waves 1-4. 
 
 
3. Estimation of the transition probabilities 
 
Health, wealth, housing and living arrangements are multidimensional concepts. We 
analyze the joint evolution of the most important dimensions of health, wealth and living 
arrangements of elderly Americans. These dimensions are our state variables and comprise the 
following characteristics:   10
•  Mortality 
•  Self-reported health status 
•  Prevalence and incidences of three major health conditions (heart condition, stroke, cancer) 
•  Wealth quartile (sum of real and financial wealth) 
•  Owner-occupancy 
•  Living arrangements (co-residence and nursing homes) 
 
 
Table 3 gives an overview of these state-variables and their possible states: 
 
 
Table 3: State variables 
Variable State  1  State 2  State 3  State 4 
Mortality Alive  Dead    
Health cond. preval.  Yes  No     
Health cond. incid.  Yes  No     
Health status  excellent/very good  Good  fair/poor   





Ownership Yes  No     
Living arrangements   Alone  with others  Nursing home   
 
 
The joint evolution of the state variables is presumably quite complex. We chose a simple 
strategy to identify basic patterns. We do not aim at presenting a structural model and attach causal 
interpretations to our findings. Instead, we interpret our approach as a more sophisticated approach 
to present descriptive evidence. The model can be interpreted like a vector autoregression (VAR) 
common in macroeconometrics: 
(1)   yt = Ayt-1 + Bxt 
 
where  y is a vector of the state or left-hand-side variables detailed in Table 3 and x 
represents a set of shift variables. We actually do not estimate a linear relation since most variables 
in y are limited dependent in their nature, but it helps to keep the macroeconomic counterpart in 
mind since our approach shares the same fundamental properties and limitations. 
More precisely, a given individual (whose subscript is omitted to ease the notational 
burden) can assume (almost) each combination of states in Table 3 at each point in time. Let at 
denote an indicator of whether the individual is alive (at=1) or not (at=0) at time t. Let y1t through   11
y6t indicate the states of the other variables from Table 3 at time t. There are 2*2*3*4*2*3=288 
combinations of these other states. Let yt denote an indicator of the state defined as a combination 
of these six variables. Finally, call xt a vector of “exogenous” variables such as age and sex. We 
are interested in understanding the evolution of the states over time, that is the probability of the 
event at = a
* and  yt = y
* given the history of yt and the explanatory variables xt. We denote this 
probability by Pr(at = a
*, yt = y
*| yt-1, yt-2, ..., xt). It is the core explanatory variable. 
In this general formulation, it is infeasible to econometrically identify this probability. We 
therefore have to impose restrictions. As a first step, we impose a first-order Markov structure on 
our model: 
(2)     Pr(at = a
*, yt = y
*| yt-1, yt-2, ..., xt) = Pr(at = a
*, yt = y
*| yt-1, xt) 
 
This is quite restrictive and could be generalized somewhat. But since we only have four waves of 
panel data, the dynamic structure that we can identify with these data is quite limited. A test of a 
more general structure such as a second-order Markov model is planned in the future. 
Secondly, the estimation of a 288x288 transition matrix is infeasible with our data (and 
any other real-world data we can think of). We therefore impose structure on the joint 
dependencies. We choose a very simple approach by assuming that the outcome probabilities of 
the state variables are conditionally (on yt-1 and xt) independent. This allows us to write 
(3)     Pr(at = a
*, yt = y
*| yt-1, xt) = Pr(at = a
*| yt-1, xt) * Pr (y1t = y1
*| yt-1, xt, at = a
*)  
* Pr (y2t = y2
*| yt-1, xt, at = a
*) * … *  Pr (y6t = y6
*| yt-1, xt, at = a
*) 
An alternative feasible approach would be to model correlations between the different state 
equations with the help of random effects models similar to Börsch-Supan, Hajivassiliou, Kotlikoff 
and Morris (1992). However, this would increase the computational burden substantially since no 
closed-form solutions for the likelihood function can be derived for these nonlinear simultaneous 
models. 
In addition, we exploit several “natural” restrictions: 
•  death is absorbing 
•  health conditions are absorbing: there is no transition from (health conditions = yes) to 
(health conditions = no)   12
•  health conditions are preceded by health incidents: if (health conditionst-1 = no), then 
Prob(health conditionst = yes)= Prob(health incidentt = yes) 
 
Given this structure, the models for the different state variables can be estimated 
separately.  Again, we choose a very convenient approach by assuming conditional independence 
over time, ignoring the panel structure of our data. This simplifies the analysis even more. In 
particular, we can simply estimate our models conditional on the first observation for each 
individual. We specify the separate models as binary logits (health condition incidence, home 
ownership), ordered logits (health status, wealth quartile), and multinomial logits (living 
arrangements). Obviously, not a full set of 287 dummy variables for yt-1 is included in the 
regressions, but simplifications are made. The are described in the following section which 
presents our estimation results. 
 
4. Estimation results 
 
Given the independent first-order Markov structure, we can estimate transition 
probabilities for the categorical variables in Table 3 conditional on lagged left-hand-side and socio-
economic variables. The results from these regressions are shown in Table 4. Except for the health 
incidence equation, all equations feature a satisfactory fit and the signs of the estimated 
coefficients – where significant – exhibit no surprises.   13
Table 4: Regression results 
  Health / mort. 
Health Cond. 
Incid.  Wealth  Ownership  Live w/others  Nurs. Home 
  Ordered Logit  Logit  Ordered Logit  Logit  Multinomial Logit 
Female  -0.192** -0.245**  -0.023 -0.110 0.093 0.138 
  (5.79) (5.71) (0.61) (1.39) (1.19) (1.39) 
Married  -0.138** -0.124*  -0.054  0.811** -0.612** -0.642** 
  (3.26) (2.22) (1.34) (9.57) (7.18) (5.67) 
Spouse died  -0.021 -0.040  1.814**  -1.074** 1.234** 1.168** 
  (0.30) (0.43)  (21.46)  (7.69) (8.64) (6.82) 
Age  0.036* 0.034 0.027 -0.001 -0.093* -0.059 
  (2.12) (1.39) (1.45) (0.03) (2.48) (0.82) 
Age Spline >75  -0.012 0.001 -0.031 -0.105 0.160** 0.220* 
  (0.49) (0.02) (1.13) (1.70) (2.84) (2.20) 
Age Spline >80  0.046* 0.018 -0.001 0.071 -0.060 0.021 
  (2.07) (0.63) (0.04) (1.40) (1.20) (0.32) 
Age Spline >85  0.028 -0.019 0.025 0.039 0.057 -0.078 
  (1.02) (0.58) (0.77) (0.63) (0.92) (1.29) 
Age Spline >90  0.046 -0.002 -0.053 -0.068 0.033 0.047 
  (1.36) (0.05) (1.26) (0.88) (0.44) (0.72) 
Health cond. prev.  0.277** 0.381**  0.010  0.043 -0.182** -0.043 
  (9.65) (10.38) (0.32)  (0.64) (2.74) (0.55) 
Health cond. incid..  1.243**   -0.020  -0.388** 0.177* 0.844** 
  (33.38)   (0.44)  (4.49) (2.05) (9.34) 
Health good  1.177** 0.272** -0.187** -0.012  -0.055  0.176 
  (30.17) (5.04)  (4.52)  (0.14) (0.63) (1.53) 
Health poor/fair  2.438** 0.815** -0.411**  -0.230** 0.330** 0.690** 
  (52.91) (14.56)  (9.53)  (2.61) (3.84) (6.42) 
Wealth Q2  -0.255** -0.203** 1.930** 0.518** -0.018  -0.111 
  (5.10) (3.17)  (34.72)  (5.17) (0.18) (0.95) 
Wealth Q3  -0.440** -0.157* 3.420** 0.624**  0.015  -0.123 
  (8.37) (2.32)  (55.38)  (5.98) (0.15) (0.98) 
Wealth Q4  -0.565** -0.229** 5.506** 0.802** -0.183  -0.255 
  (10.31) (3.22) (77.63) (7.33) (1.62) (1.91) 
Home owner  -0.010 -0.034  0.560**  4.850** -0.070 -0.574** 
  (0.25) (0.66)  (11.79)  (58.98) (0.79)  (5.71) 
Live w/others  -0.081 -0.123  -0.117** 0.109 4.464**  1.883** 
  (0.57) (0.66) (2.67) (1.22) (60.95)  (16.11) 
Nurs. Home  -1.237** -1.266** -0.921** 0.021 1.541**  4.348** 
  (3.31) (2.89) (5.96) (0.08) (4.20)  (20.95) 
# children       0.274**  -0.047 
       (6.00)  (0.61) 
# female children      0.067  -0.026 
       (1.82)  (0.50) 
# married children      -0.205**  0.037 
       (5.52)  (0.66) 
# children with children      -0.095*  -0.022 
       (2.04)  (0.28) 
Constant   -4.201*  -2.336  3.703  0.593 
   (2.29)  (0.74)  (1.34)  (0.11) 
Log-Lik  -18998.25 -8559.63 -14310.42 -3315.79 -5618.71   
rho^2  0.16 0.04 0.29 0.62 0.45   
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses       
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%           14
The first column shows ordered logit estimates for a combined health status/mortality 
regression. The dependent variable is coded as (1) excellent/very good health, (2) good health, (3) 
poor/fair health, (4) deceased. Not surprisingly, health deteriorates with increasing age. This effect 
accelerates in old age as the additional slope parameters of the age spline are positive. Being 
female and being married increases self-reported health. The prevalence of serious health 
conditions (heart condition, stroke, cancer) negatively affects the self-reported health status. A 
health condition incident since the previous wave dramatically increases mortality probabilities and 
decreases the self-reported health status. Health status is persistent over time in the sense that the 
reported health status in the previous wave is a strong predictor of mortality and current health 
status. In this health regression, we do not use lagged living arrangements directly. The reason for 
this is that living arrangements are driven by expectations of future health, leading to a serious 
endogeneity problem in this regression. Instead, we instrument living arrangements in this 
regression with detailed characteristics of children. 
Many of the results of the health condition incidence regression are similar to the health 
status/mortality regression. The age coefficients are not individually significant, but a Wald-test 
shows high joint significance (W = 83.59 ª~ χ
2
[5]). Being in the lowest wealth quartile increases the 
probability to suffer from a major health incident, but there is no significant difference between the 
three highest quartiles. 
Respondents reporting a positive health status are more likely to be wealthier in the next 
interview, but the health conditions we included in our measure have no effect on wealth. Marital 
status is an important determinant home ownership. Events like the death of the spouse and a major 
health incident lead to a high number of people selling their home. But variables like self-reported 
health status and wealth quartile also have important effects. The age spline has a significantly 
negative slope only for the respondents aged 75-80 years. For the others, factors like decreasing 
health seem to drive the further decrease of home ownership. 
The results of the living arrangement regression show that living with others and nursing 
homes are in fact substitutes in the sense that the explanatory variables do have similar effects on 
the probabilities to choose one of these alternatives. Married couples tend to live alone until one 
spouse dies. The surviving spouse is very likely to move either to children or into a nursing home 
shortly afterwards. Health condition incidents also lead respondents to move together with 
somebody and – even more so – to move into a nursing home. Similarly, poor or fair health status   15
leads to changes in this direction. Since most cohabitants are own children, their characteristics 
obviously play an important role in explaining cohabitation. Female children are more likely to live 
with their parents, whereas married children and those who have children themselves are less likely 
to do so. 
 
 
5.  Simulating trajectories 
 
According to equation (3), we can rebuild a full 289x289 transition matrix of survival and 
the six other state variables yt for a given set of shift variables xt. Starting from a suitably chosen 
initial state, we are thus able to simulate predicted trajectories for our left-hand-side variables. 
More specifically, we start these trajectories at age 70 and follow an elderly person 
through age 90. A particularly interesting date of observation is age 80, approximately the 
conditional life expectancy given survival to age 70. In the simulations, the estimated transition 
matrices are interpreted as being valid for 2-year transitions in accordance to the biannual nature of 
the AHEAD data. This is important when interpreting the age variable. 
The simulations are done in four steps: 
1.  Start at initial probabilities (typically=1 for one state, 0 for the others) and a set of shift 
variables x for t=0 
2.  Calculate the 289x289 transition matrix as described above 
3.  Predict probabilities for t=1 
4.  Repeat steps 2.-3. until age 90 is reached. 
 
We will perform several exercises. First, we predict whole system for different initial 
conditions, taking account of all (implicit) interactions. Second, in Subsection 5.1 through 5.3, we 
look at various dimensions separately (like wealthy vs. poor, healthy vs. sick, etc.). For instance, 
how does survival, how do living arrangements, change with initial health, with initial wealth?  
Third, in Subsection 5.4, we decompose the observed effects by leaving some of the left-hand-side 
variables at their starting values. This amounts to setting some off-diagonal elements in the 
transition matrix to zero and therefore annihilates interaction effects. Note that we painfully avoid 
any notion of causality – these exercises should be interpreted as simulations of persons under 
different circumstances and initial conditions.  Finally, in Subsection 5.5, we simulate “shocks”   16
such as the onset of a health condition and look at the resulting response pattern. This last exercise 
is well-known in the macroeconomics literature as “response analysis”. 
To warm up to our methodology, we start with Figure 2 which shows the trajectories of 
two very different people. The left figure shows a poor single person in bad health, while the right 
figure depicts a rich married person in good health. Good health is defined by a self-reported health 
status of excellent or very good; bad health by a self-reported health status of poor or fair. The rich 
person is in the highest wealth quartile, while the poor person is in the lowest one. All other 
characteristics are identical. Both persons are male, have no children, have no previous health 
conditions and live independently in an owner-occupied home. 
 
Figure 2: Trajectories of two very different people: 
 











































The figure presents the evolution of our seven state variables, each represented by a line 
which starts at an initial probability and then moves from that initial probability as the two people 
age. The first five state variables start at identical initial values for both persons. The dark blue line 
depicts the survival probability, starting with 1 and declining with age. The dark green line shows 
the probability of a health condition, starting with zero and increasing with age. The purple line is 
the probability of homeownership. It starts at 1 and declines with age. The light green line 
represents the probability of living with others, the grey line living in a nursing home. Both start at   17
zero and increase with age. Finally, two state variables start at different values, namely wealth, 
represented by a light blue line, and self-reported health, depicted in red. 
Quite clearly, survival at age 80 is much higher (about 40%) for the healthy, rich and 
married person. The probability to end up in poverty is, as expected, also much lower. Note that 
the trajectories eventually converge. In the long run, we are all dead. Mathematically speaking, the 
outcome of the Markov process will eventually be independent of the initial state and converge on 
a state solely defined by the transition matrix. For a given age, this matrix depends on “shift” 
variables such as sex, the number of children etc., i.e. the xt in equation (2). 
It is worth to look at various details in Figure 2 to understand which mechanisms are 
picked up by our estimated transition probabilities. For instance, it is noticeable that the probability 
to reach the lowest quartile in the wealth distribution increases again for the poorer person past age 
84 which probably reflects nursing home costs – the poorer single person of worse health has a 
much higher likelihood of living in a nursing home than the richer married person of good health. 
We now analyze the state variables separately and investigate their interaction with other 
state variables. Subsection 5.1 looks at survival and health, subsection 5.2 at wealth and 
homeownership, and subsection 5.3 at living arrangements of the elderly. 
 
5.1   Survival and health 
 
We begin with survival, and relate it to initial wealth and initial health. Figure 3 shows the 
probability of survival as a function of two initial health characteristics, self-reported health 
(“would you rate your health fair/poor vs. excellent/very good”) and the existence of at least one 
previous serious health condition (“has a doctor ever told you...”) where serious conditions include 
heart problems, stroke and cancer. The survival curves remain essentially parallel whether such a 
condition exists or not, while the effect of the self-rated health assessment is strong, maybe 
measuring other conditions such as arthritis or diabetes which are making life difficult without 
being immediately life threatening. 
Figure 3: Survival by health status:   18













Male single,hc prev=1, health=3, wealth=4, own=1, liv.arr=1
Male single,hc prev=2, health=3, wealth=4, own=1, liv.arr=1
Male single,hc prev=1, health=1, wealth=4, own=1, liv.arr=1
Male single,hc prev=2, health=1, wealth=4, own=1, liv.arr=1
 
 
Figure 4 shows survival stratified by initial wealth. Survival at age 80, given survival until 
age 70, is about 15% higher in the highest wealth quartile as compared to the lowest wealth 
quartile. The right part of the figure shows the interaction of wealth and health in determining 
survival, and the relative magnitudes of the effects: survival, while clearly dependent on initial 
wealth, is much stronger influenced by initial health.   19
Figure 4: Survival by wealth quartile and its interaction with health 













Male single,hc prev=2, health=1, wealth=1, own=1, liv.arr=1
Male single,hc prev=2, health=1, wealth=2, own=1, liv.arr=1
Male single,hc prev=2, health=1, wealth=3, own=1, liv.arr=1
Male single,hc prev=2, health=1, wealth=4, own=1, liv.arr=1













Male single,hc prev=2, health=1, wealth=1, own=1, liv.arr=1
Male single,hc prev=2, health=1, wealth=4, own=1, liv.arr=1
Male single,hc prev=2, health=3, wealth=1, own=1, liv.arr=1
Male single,hc prev=2, health=3, wealth=4, own=1, liv.arr=1
 
 
Similar to survival, health is quite clearly influenced by the initial economic status. Figure 
5 shows the evolution of two dimensions of health over time, each stratified by whether the person 
is initially in the lowest and in the highest wealth quartile. The left part of the figure depicts self-
reported health, the right part the prevalence of a serious health condition. Being wealthy decreases 
the likelihood of feeling in bad health by about 12 percentage points at age 75 relative to being in 
the lowest wealth quartile. This wealth effects is much smaller for an actual occurrence of a serious 
health condition. 
   20
Figure 5: Health by lowest and highest wealth quartile 













Male single,hc prev=2, health=1, wealth=1, own=1, liv.arr=1
Male single,hc prev=2, health=1, wealth=4, own=1, liv.arr=1













Male single,hc prev=2, health=2, wealth=1, own=1, liv.arr=1





5.2   Wealth and homeownership 
 
We now turn to wealth and homeownership, starting with the latter. Homeownership 
declines slowly but steadily as people age. The decline in homeownership follows from the 
tendency of the system to converge. Hence, its speed is the interesting observation since this relates 
to our regression estimates of Section 4. Quite clearly, homeownership declines much less for 
married elderly than for single ones. It also declines faster for the poor (more precisely: those with 
total wealth in the lowest quartile) than for the rich (highest wealth quartile). We will investigate 
this decline more closely in Section 6. 
   21
Figure 6: Homeownership by wealth and marital status 













Male single,hc prev=2, health=3, wealth=1, own=1, liv.arr=1
Male single,hc prev=2, health=3, wealth=4, own=1, liv.arr=1
Male married,hc prev=2, health=3, wealth=1, own=1, liv.arr=1
Male married,hc prev=2, health=3, wealth=4, own=1, liv.arr=1
 
 
The tendency of the system to converge is also clearly visible in Figure 7 which depicts 
the evolution of wealth. The left part of this figure shows a poor person (lowest wealth quartile) 
and the probability to stay in this quartile. This probability declines, but increases again, most 
likely due to nursing home costs. Figure 7 stratifies this decline by initial living arrangement. 
Staying in the poor quartile is most likely when an elderly person lives in a nursing home, and least 
likely when this person lives with others.
2 The right part of Figure 7 shows the reversed patterns as 
it looks at the probability of staying in the highest wealth quartile. For the initially wealthy, living 
with others decreases the expected future wealth relative to living alone. This is consistent with the 
notion that cohabitation implies intra-family transfers to the needy. 
 
                                                 
2 Remember that this finding should not be interpreted in a causal fashion: we only know that the two processes 
(wealth decumulation and where to live) are correlated, but not which process causes which other process to change.   22
Figure 7: Wealth by living arrangement 













Male single,hc prev=2, health=2, wealth=1, own=1, liv.arr=1
Male single,hc prev=2, health=2, wealth=1, own=1, liv.arr=2
Male single,hc prev=2, health=2, wealth=1, own=1, liv.arr=3













Male single,hc prev=2, health=2, wealth=4, own=1, liv.arr=1
Male single,hc prev=2, health=2, wealth=4, own=1, liv.arr=2
Male single,hc prev=2, health=2, wealth=4, own=1, liv.arr=3
 
 
5.3   Living arrangements 
 
We now turn to the main topic of this paper, namely living arrangements. We distinguish 
three living arrangements: living alone (or as a couple), living with others (mainly with adult 
children), and living in a nursing home. Figure 8 depicts the probability of the first two living 
arrangements and shows the effect of additional children, in this case three daughters. Figure 9 
adds the probability of living in a nursing home. The figures compare a single male, who has no 
previous health conditions, who rates his health as fair or poor, who he is in the lowest wealth 
quartile and who has one son, with a similar male, who has, in addition, three daughters. 
Having daughters substantially decreases the probability of being alone at age 80 (by 
about 20%) and living in a nursing home (by about 10%) in favor of living with others – i.e., being 
taken in by one of the daughters (by almost 30%). Interesting is the gender-specific effect of 
additional children. As shown in many other papers, daughters reduce the likelihood of living in a 
nursing home substantially more than sons (right panel of Figure 9). 
   23
Figure 8: Probability to live alone or with another person in the community 













One son, married, has kids
One son, married, has kids & 3 daughters, not married













One son, married, has kids
One son, married, has kids & 3 daughters, not married
 
Figure 9: Probability to live in a nursing home 













One son, married, has kids
One son, married, has kids & 3 daughters, not married
One son, married, has kids & 3 sons, not married
   24
 
5.4   Decomposing the effects: keep some dimensions fixed 
 
The next experiment separates direct and indirect effects. In the previous simulations, all 
left-hand-side variables in equation (1) were predicted using the full transition matrix. Now we 
hold certain dimensions constant. As an example, we show the evolution of the survival 
probabilities (Figure 10) and the probability of being in the highest wealth quartile (Figure 11). The 
figures show how the interaction effects in the full model dampens the effects that would be 
predicted without the interactions. 
We begin with the survival probabilities in Figure 10. The blue line shows the trajectory 
using the full model with all interactions. In all other lines, the occurrence of a serious health 
condition is fixed at “no occurrence”. This shifts, as expected, the survival probabilities up (green 
line). If we also assume that self-reported health stays fixed at “excellent or very good”, survival 
rates stay very high and decline only slowly (red line). Fixing self-reported health at a “poor or 
fair” level, of course, creates the opposite effect (turquoise line). 
Figure 10: Decomposing survival probabilities by health effects 













Male single,hc prev=2, health=1, wealth=4, own=1, liv.arr=1
Male single,hc prev (exog.)=2, health=1, wealth=4, own=1, liv.arr=1
Male single,hc prev (exog.)=2, health(exog.)=1, wealth=4, own=1, liv.arr=1
Male single,hc prev (exog.)=2, health(exog.)=3, wealth=4, own=1, liv.arr=1
 
 
Figure 11 performs a similar exercise with the probability of being in the highest wealth 
quartile. The blue and the green lines shows initial trajectories using the full model with all   25
interactions. The blue line starts with a healthy individual (self-rated health “excellent or very 
good”), the green one with an unhealthy elderly (self-rated health “poor or fair”). Note that the two 
lines eventually merge – there is no long-run effect of health on wealth, although at age 75 the 
probability of being in the highest wealth quartile is substantially higher for the initially healthy 
individual. 
If we now keep the initial health status fixed (red and turquoise lines), the trajectories stay 
apart. The probability of staying in the highest wealth quartile is about 15% higher for the elderly, 
who stays healthy through age 90. 
Figure 11: Decomposing the probability of being wealthy 













Male single,hc prev=2, health=1, wealth=4, own=1, liv.arr=1
Male single,hc prev=2, health=3, wealth=4, own=1, liv.arr=1
Male single,hc prev (exog.)=2, health(exog.)=1, wealth=4, own=1, liv.arr=1
Male single,hc prev (exog.)=2, health(exog.)=3, wealth=4, own=1, liv.arr=1
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5.5   Dose and response analysis 
Finally, we look at the behavior of the multidimensional system in response to shocks. 
Figure 12 depicts the survival probability after a health shock (“doctor told person about one of the 
following three conditions: heart problem, onset of cancer, or stroke”). We compare this turquoise 
trajectory to the one generated by the full model (with all interactions, blue line) and to two 
variants in which the health condition is kept fixed, as we did in the previous subsection. We fix it 
at “no conditions” (green) and at “some conditions exist at the age of 70, but no further incidents 
occur” (red). 
 
Figure 12: Survival probabilities in response to a health shock 
 













Male single,hc prev=2, health=1, wealth=4, own=1, liv.arr=1
Male single,hc prev (exog.)=2, health=1, wealth=4, own=1, liv.arr=1
Male single,hc prev (exog.)=1, health=1, wealth=4, own=1, liv.arr=1
Male single,hc prev (exog.)=2, hc incid. at 80, health=1, wealth=4, own=1, liv.arr=1
  
 
Figure 12 show that the survival probabilities in the aftermath of a health shock follow 
pretty much the long run paths. There are no overshooting or other complex dynamic effects. This 
is quite different for the self-reported health status, see Figure 13. We apply the same shock, but 
focus on self-reported health as outcome variable. The light blue line depicts the typical 
“overshooting” after a shock vis-à-vis the trajectory where this condition has been happened in the 
past. After a while, the health status perception variable returns approximately to the long run path.   27
Part of this effect, however, is a selection effect due to differential mortality. If we also 
keep the survival variable fixed at probability one, see the purple line in Figure 13, subjective 
health stays worse for a long time past the occurrence of the shock for those who actually survive. 
 
Figure 13: Self-rated health in response to a health shock 
 













Male single,hc prev=2, health=1, wealth=4, own=1, liv.arr=1
Male single,hc prev (exog.)=2, health=1, wealth=4, own=1, liv.arr=1
Male single,hc prev (exog.)=1, health=1, wealth=4, own=1, liv.arr=1
Male single,hc prev (exog.)=2, hc incid. at 80, health=1, wealth=4, own=1, liv.arr=1
Cond. on surv: Male single, hc prev (exog., inc. at 80)=2, health=1, wealth=4, own=1, liv.arr=1
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6. Do the elderly downsize housing? 
In the preceding section, we found that homeownership decreases with age. We noted that 
the Markov process has the built-in property of convergence, hence, declining homeownership is, 
to some extent, an artifact built into the model. We did, however, detect some significant 
differences in the speed of decline depending on the initial characteristics of the elderly person. 
This suggests that there are elderly in our sample who systematically decumulate housing. This 
section looks closer at the issue of homeownership.  We note that ownership is somewhat different 
from housing equity which can be influenced by mortgage repayment, housing price changes, or 
neglect of maintenance.  Venti and Wise (1990, 2001) found that in general the elderly to not 
reduce home equity except at the death of a spouse. 
Table 5 shows cross-section housing and living arrangements by age bands.  About 82% of 
those 70-74 years old were owners, and most of them lived “alone,” either with a spouse only or 
singly.  The table shows a slow but accelerating decline in ownership with age and a corresponding 
increase in renting, although until 85 or over the increase is small.  Most notable in the table is the 
increase in “other” which includes neither renting nor owning (mostly living with children in their 
house) and living in a nursing home, especially at 85 or over. 
Table 5: Homeownership and living arrangements, percent distribution. 
 70-74 75-79 80-84 85+
Own 81.6 77.2 70.7 57.6
own, alone  66.4 64.0 57.3 43.1
own, with others  14.7 12.1 11.5 9.0
own, nursing home  0.5 1.1 1.9 5.5
Rent 14.0 16.3 18.1 22.2
rent, alone  11.1 13.7 15.7 18.7
rent, with others  2.9 2.6 2.4 3.5
neither own nor rent  4.3 6.0 9.5 13.1
not own, nursing home  0.2 0.6 1.8 7.0
All 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
N  4,099 7,157 5,427 4,535
Source: AHEAD pooled cross-sections (four waves) 
 
Because of differential mortality we would expect a greater decline in owning in panel than 
we see in cross-section, although cohort differences could obscure this decline.   29
Table 6 has cross-section housing and living arrangements for married persons.  The 
patterns are similar to the patterns in Table 5, but there is a much slower reduction in ownership 
with age.  By age 85 or over the ownership rate is 13 percentage points lower than at 70-74 
whereas in Table 5 it is 24 percentage points lower.  In the oldest group  about 7% live in a nursing 
home. 
Table 6: Homeownership and living arrangements, percent distribution.  Married. 
 70-74 75-79 80-84 85+
Own 90.4 88.6 85.5 77.1
own, alone  76.7 77.8 75.3 67.1
own, with others  13.3 10.2 8.8 5.9
own, nursing home  0.4 0.6 1.4 4.1
Rent 7.7 8.6 10.0 14.0
rent, alone  6.5 7.2 9.2 13.2
rent, with others  1.2 1.4 0.8 0.8
neither own nor rent  1.9 2.5 4.2 5.8
not own, nursing home  0.0 0.2 0.4 3.0
All 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
N  2,555 3,733 2,238 1,232
Source: AHEAD pooled cross-sections (four waves) 
 
Table 7 has similar results for singles.  The levels of ownership are lower and decline at a 
greater rate with age.  By age 85 or over 14.5% live in nursing home and 15.9% neither own nor 
rent. 
Table 7: Homeownership and living arrangements, percent distribution.  Singles. 
 70-74 75-79 80-84 85+
Own 66.8 64.7 60.1 50.3
own, alone  49.2 48.9 44.5 34.1
own, with others  17.0 14.2 13.4 10.2
own, nursing home  0.6 1.6 2.2 6.0
Rent 24.6 24.5 23.8 25.3
rent, alone  18.8 20.7 20.3 20.8
rent, with others  5.8 3.8 3.5 4.5
neither own nor rent  8.2 9.8 13.3 15.9
not own, nursing home  0.5 1.0 2.8 8.5
All 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
N  1,544 3,420 3,178 3,298
Source: AHEAD pooled cross-sections (four waves) 
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Figure 14 has the average ownership rates by cohort.  For example approximately 75% of 
the cohort of birth years 1919-1923 owned a house in wave 1 of  AHEAD (when the cohort was 
approximately 77) and the ownership rate of the cohort declined to 69% when the cohort was about 
84 in 2000.  The figure shows that cohort differences are relatively minor:  holding age constant 
cohort ownership rates are approximately the same.
3  The cohort comparisons include differential 
mortality, the tendency for renters to die sooner than owners.  Differential mortality causes average 
ownership to increase even if there is no reduction in ownership in panel. 



















Source: AHEAD pooled cross-sections (four waves) 
 
Table 8 shows panel transitions among survivors.  Among marrieds in the youngest age 
group, there were very low rates of transition out of ownership, and some transitions into 
ownership.  But the predominant flow is out because of high rates of ownership.  The transition 
rate out of ownership increases with age. 
                                                 
3  But the sample sizes are small in some cases.   31
Table 8: Home ownership transition rates (percent). Survivors only 
       ownership  status 
Marital transition  Age  lagged ownership  number own not own 
Married to married  70-74  own  2013 98.3 1.7 
   not  own  179 9.5 90.5 
 75-79  own  2142 97.0 3.0 
   not  own  259 11.2 88.8 
 80-84  own  1068 94.4 5.6 
   not  own  160 12.5 87.5 
 85+  own  419 93.8 6.2 
   not  own  114 10.5 89.5 
      
single to single  70-74  own  929 94.6 5.4 
   not  own  449 8.9 91.1 
 75-79  own  1568 91.8 8.2 
   not  own  858 8.2 91.8 
 80-84  own  1201 90.0 10.0 
   not  own  762 4.2 95.8 
 85+  own  855 89.0 11.0 
   not  own  817 5.4 94.6 
      
married to single  70-74  own  146 93.2 6.8 
   not  own 34 8.8 91.2 
 75-79  own  223 86.1 13.9 
   not  own 55 12.7 87.3 
 80-84  own  155 85.2 14.8 
   not  own 44 0.0 100.0 
 85+  own  86 79.1 20.9 
   not  own 28 7.1 92.9 
Source: AHEAD pooled cross-sections (four waves) 
 
From the flows the steady-state rate of ownership (the ownership rate were the transition 
rates into and out of ownership to remain constant for the indefinite future) is given by 
  1
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, and  00 P  is the transition probability from not owning to not owning, and  11 P  is the 
transition probability from owning to owning.  Among those married in both waves t  and  1 t +  and 
in the age band 70-74 the steady-state rate of ownership is 84.8% and the actual average is 91.8%.  
Thus there is a trend out of ownership among marrieds, but the trend is slow.  Among marrieds   32
aged 85 or over the steady-state rate is 62.9% and the average is 78.6%, also showing a downward 
trend in ownership. 
Among those who were single in two adjacent waves the transition rate out of ownership 
increases with age.  The steady-state rates decline from 62.2% in the age band 70-74  to 32.9% in 
the age band 85 or over. 
Widowing is associated with considerably higher rates of transition out of ownership:  for 
example, among those aged 70-74 who were widowed between adjacent waves the transition rate 
out of ownership was 6.8% compared with just 1.7% among surviving couples.  This rate increases 
sharply with age. 
We ask whether the panel transitions can explain the cross-section patterns of ownership 
that are in Table 5.  Figure 14 indicated that cohort differences are not important but we must still 
address differential mortality.  The average risk (holding age constant) of a renter dying compared 
with an owner dying is about 1.39:  said differently, the age adjusted mortality rate of renters is 
about 39% higher than the mortality rate of owners.  In that renters die more frequently than 
owners the average rate of ownership by a cohort will increase over time even if there are no 
transitions into or out of ownership in panel among survivors.  However, the rate of ownership is 
high so that differential mortality will not increase the average ownership rate substantially as a 
cohort ages.  Under the assumption that owners and renters have the same mortality risk,  the 
average over all groups, the home ownership rate would decline by about 0.4% per year more than 
the observed cohort rate. The difference is shown in Figure 15: It shows the cross-section 
ownership rates averaged over four waves of AHEAD data;  the rates predicted from the panel 
ownership transitions reported in Table 8 (panel), and the rates predicted both from the panel and 
from differential mortality (panel accounting for differential mortality).   
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Source: Own computations based on AHEAD. 
 
 
The cumulative effects of differential mortality can be seen by comparing the two panel 
lines: after about 15 years the simulation that accounts for differential mortality is about five 
percentage points above the simulation that does not.  The cross-section is very closely matched by 
the simulation that accounts for differential mortality showing that cohort effects are not very 
important and that the transition rates over the period of our sample (mid- to late-1990s) have been 
stable for a considerable time. 
The difference between the time paths of ownership by singles and by couples and the 
effects of widowing on ownership are shown in Figure 16.  The top curve, for couples, and the 
bottom curve, for singles, are derived from the estimated transition rates in ownership in Table 8-4 
beginning with an ownership rate of 100%  at age 70.  The curves are conditional on survival and 
so have the interpretation of anticipated lifetime probabilities of owning.  Thus, if both spouses of a 
couple survive to 90, the probability of owning will decline to about 75%.  Among singles who are 
owners at age 70 the rate of decline is considerably greater, and the probability of owning at age 90 
less than 50%.  The middle curve shows predicted rates of ownership of couples who are owners at 







mortality   34
widowhood the probability of owning declines sharply as shown in Table 8-4, and then the 
probability follows the path of singles but at a higher level.   
Figure 16: Projected ownership rates 
Figure 3
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Source: Own computations based on AHEAD. 
 
The two curves at the bottom of Figure 16 show the probability of males and of females 
dying at each age conditional on reaching age 70.  The most likely age for males to die is 82 and it 
is 88 for females.  The figure suggests that 50-60% of couples who are owners at age 70  will be 
owners at the death of the surviving spouse, and that a somewhat lower fraction of singles will be 
owners.  These percentages are not much different from the estimates of Sheiner and Weil (1992) 
who estimated that among couples who were owners at age 65, just 41% of the last survivor would 
die still owning. 
The life-cycle model (LCM) predicts that wealth will be decumulated as people age, and in 
Figure 17 we compare the wealth paths predicted in three different ways with the rate of ownership 
among singles.  The objective of the comparison is to find whether the path of ownership as an   35
indicator of housing wealth is broadly consistent with wealth paths as predicted by the LCM.  The 
first wealth forecast (labeled wealth...SIPP) uses observed wealth change in the 1984-85 SIPP 
panel.  The second (labeled wealth...subjective probabilities) is based on the subjective probability 
of bequests as elicited in the HRS.  Hurd and Smith (2002) compared them with actual 
bequeathable wealth to estimate annual rates of anticipated dissaving, which we use to construct 
the curve.  The third (labeled wealth...model) uses a life-cycle model estimated over the 1969-1979 
Retirement History Survey to predict the path of bequeathable wealth (Hurd, 1989).
4  The rates of 
decumulation of bequeathable wealth are broadly consistent with each other.  They predict that a 
single person who survives into his or her 90s will have consumed three fourths or more of 
bequeathable wealth. 
Figure 17: Homeownership and wealth 
Figure 4
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Source: Own computations based on AHEAD. 
                                                 
4  We would like to use the AHEAD wealth data for this comparison but two problems prevent its use:  stock 
ownership was apparently under-reported by about 10 percentage points in the 1993 wave, leading to a very large 
increase in measured wealth between 1993 and 1995 (Haider, Hurd and Rohwedder, 2003).  There is no obvious way 
to correct for this data error.  The 1995 wave of AHEAD  was followed by the stock market boom, leading to wealth 
increases that were likely unanticipated, and do not reflect planned life-cycle wealth accumulation.   36
 
The path of home ownership initially follows the path of bequeathable wealth, but after 
about 10 years it is higher than all of them.  The lower rate of decline probably reflects a number of 
ways in which housing wealth is treated differently from nonhousing wealth.  There are substantial 
transaction costs in moving from home ownership to renting, so that there will be a tendency to 
retain housing beyond what would be optimal were adjustment costless.  People have  a 
sentimental attachment to a particular house which increases the transaction costs.  There is risk 
associated with renting such as inflation in rental costs whereas, except for property tax and 
maintenance, owned housing is a way of purchasing a stream of real consumption. 
We can find whether the increase with age in the rate transitions out of owning is a pure age 
effect or is associated with characteristics such as health or economic circumstances.  Our method 
is to estimate the probability of owning in wave t+1 as a function of characteristics and economic 
circumstances as well as ownership status in wave t.  Using four waves of AHEAD we have three 
transitions.  Table 9 shows the ratio of the probability of owning to not owning (the risk of owning) 
of someone with one of the characteristics displayed in the first column divided by the risk of 
owning of someone in the reference group.  These results are estimated by multivariate logit over 
the three transitions. Thus someone who is married has a risk of owning in wave t + 1 which is 
124% higher than the risk of someone who is not married and the difference is significant at less 
than the 0.001 level.   37




spouse died  0.34 0.000
age splines 70  1.00 0.994
                   75  0.90 0.090
                   80  1.07 0.174
                   85  1.04 0.526
                   90  0.93 0.377
health condition  1.05 0.484
health incident  0.68 0.000
health good  0.99 0.936
health fair/poor  0.79 0.006
housing wealth quartile lowest  0.60 0.000
                       quartile 2 and 3  -- --
                       highest  1.19 0.063
nonhousing wealth quartile lowest  0.87 0.094
                       quartile 2 and 3  -- --
                       highest  1.32 0.002
Homeowner 101.67 0.000
live with others  1.09 0.359
nursing home  1.13 0.607
Source: Own computations based on AHEAD. 
 
The covariates with substantial explanatory power and statistical significance are the death 
of a spouse, which reduces the likelihood of owning in the next wave; the incidence of a health 
event; baseline health of fair or poor; and measures of wealth, as well as ownership itself.  Of note 
is that age per se is not associated with an accelerating transition out of home ownership.  This 
implies that the increased transition rates by age band that are in Table 8 are due to worsening 
health and possibly reductions in wealth that occur with age. 
We have included two wealth measures: housing wealth and nonhousing wealth.  For each 
we define three categories: the lowest wealth quartile, the second and third quartiles, and the 
highest quartile.  Both types of wealth are associated with higher levels of ownership.  That is, 
those with more housing wealth and those with more nonhousing wealth tend to retain ownership.  
We had anticipated that high housing wealth combined with low nonhousing wealth would be 
associated with an elevated probability of selling the home, but the four interactions were neither 
economically nor statistically significant.   38
In summary we find that homeownership is reduced with age but that the rate of reduction 
is less than the rate of reduction of nonhousing wealth.  The lower rate of decline is likely due to a 
mixture of causes:  housing may be held for a precautionary motive as in Skinner (1996);  it may 
be held until health makes ownership infeasible whereas health should not affect the ability to hold 
financial wealth;  in that its sale is often associated with widowing as in Venti and Wise (2001), it 
may be use to cover costs associated with widowing.   
Some of these explanations are consistent with a life-cycle model extended to include 
precautionary saving: poor health or a health event are predictors of reduced life expectancy, which 
should accelerate the decumulation of wealth.  However, the interaction of health with the 




This paper investigated the interaction among health, wealth and where elderly persons live. We 
reproduce the finding that wealth and health are strongly related to each other. Wealthier persons 
live longer and are longer healthy. This interaction is moderated by where elderly persons live. 
Remaining in the lowest wealth quartile is most likely when an elderly person lives in a nursing 
home, and least likely when this person lives with others. The reversed patterns is true for the 
probability of remaining in the highest wealth quartile. For the initially wealthy, living with others 
decreases the expected future wealth relative to living alone. This is consistent with the notion that 
cohabitation implies intra-family transfers to the needy. For those, who remain living 
independently, homeownership declines, but the speed of reduction is slower than we would expect 
for financial wealth. 
Results in this paper are descriptive and imply no causality. Further research will apply more 
sophisticated econometric methods in order to identify patterns of causality.   39
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